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China is unmistakably an economic powerhouse of the
twenty-first century. Two decades of economic reforms
have transformed China. Some most visible impacts of
the reforms include the many city skylines towering in
major cities, new products and fashion filled department
stores, and cars clogs the streets where decades ago only
bicycles were seen. The economy is expanding rapidly
with double-digit growth rates. Increased economic
activity has raised the per capita income of the urban
population from $383 Yuan per annum in 1978 to $1686
Yuan in 1991 (Duckett, 1998, p 41). But to what extent is
this true in corporate governance and law reforms?
China’s former company laws were enacted in 1904,
1914, 1929 and 1946 respectively. Tomasic and Fu (1999,
p 135) argued that:
All of these laws have reflected a considerable
degree of central government control and have
had limited impact on the organisation of
business activity in China. Historically, Chinese
governments have not encouraged commerce,
perhaps due to the long-standing policy of
national isolation and what some have described
as a Confucian disdain for the world of business.
This meant that the state provided minimal
protection for private business, so that, by
default, the family and the relationships of trust
became a more secure basis for business activity
than formal bodies of law, such as company law. 
A recent attempt by the Chinese government to
modernise China’s company law was in 1994 and was
significant for a Communist regime. Subsequent key
amendments were made in 2006.
Since modern concepts of corporate governance and
laws an alien for China, Western models have been
adopted as benchmarks. Concerns about the suitability of
Western governance principles for China are justifiable
due to the ideological and cultural differences between
them. Consequently, how robust and applicable are these
new laws? These are some of the issues this article will
attempt to examine.
To develop further insights into governance practices, a
case study on the Chinese telecommunications sector is
selected. Even though there are limitations in case study
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South Korean and Taiwan. This requires greater emphasis on regulating markets and governing
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transplanting Western models, more modification to suit Chinese political and cultural considerations
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analysis, certain patterns and norms of large Chinese
enterprises can be identified. Given the Chinese
government’s reform agenda and privatisation programs,
we will explore whether State-owned enterprises (SOE)
have transformed into modern and competitive entities
like those in the developed Western nations.
Theorising corporate governance and 
law in the Chinese context
Corporate governance can be an imprecise and all-
embracing concept. It can be narrowly defined as how
companies are directed and steered (Farrar, 2001, p 3), or
broadly described as a system of checks and balances to
ensure that decision makers are accountable to various
stakeholders (Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p 13–5).
Governance entails both structural mechanisms and
relational protocols involving processes and decisions
administered by formal and informal rules (Hunt and
Wickham, 1994, 78–9). 
Rules imposed by the state would usually consist of laws,
regulations, and codes, where penalties would be
imposed for non-compliance, or conflict resolution
through the courts would be available (Farrar, 2001, 
p 3–4). This would necessitate the creation of institutions
to monitor and prosecute for breach of those rules.
Appropriate penalties would also have to be set to
redress the wrongs and function as deterrents against
others from certain deviant actions and inactions. State
rules are therefore costly requiring sizable resources and
many institutional processes and safeguards.
Whereas rules within an organisation are a form of self-
regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p 19–20) unlike
state laws or regulations, according to Giddens (1984)
rules can be a form of routine and practice. They can also
be constitutive and regulative norms to control behaviour.
Consequently, organisational rules are dynamic and
complex as organisations adapt and change in relation to
the context, use and interpretation of the rules. Such
rules need to be communicated through verbal and non-
verbal interactions, constantly subjected to multiple and
subjective sense making regarding their application and
implementation. Hence, rules in an organisation are less
rigid than state imposed obligations. This can be both
positive and negative.
State imposed rules and regulations are inclined to be
prescriptive, comprehensive and certain with the proviso
that they are well drafted and practicable. State imposed
regulations should be understood as a ‘fall-back’ measure
to invoke when organisational rules fail. State regulations
are not a substitute for organisational rules (Farrar, 2001,
p 3–10). The interdependent nature of state imposed and
organisation generated rules accentuate the importance
of instituting robust governance regimes where the state
complements organisational rules by formulating
regulations in a concise, consistent and coherent manner.
Over the last two decades, there have been a number of
conflicting theories about corporate governance. Yet the
underlying assumptions and arguments seem to be
shaped by contextual considerations that understand that
there is no ‘one size fits all’ model. Thus, tailoring to each
sector and country could be more effective because it
incorporates cultural and socio-political factors in its
model (Lau and Young, 2006, p 41–2).
The two leading theories are agency and stakeholder.
The agency theory presumes that ownership and control
of the corporation is separate. Therefore, shareholders
incur cost in monitoring managers’ compliance. The
stakeholders argue that managers and boards of
directors, creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors and
corporate regulators should be incorporated in
governance. This approach tends to blur the ‘lines’ of
accountability when executives do have a clear chain of
command to answer to as a priority separate to the
notion of generating profits (Clarke, 2004, p 189, 196).
Letza, Sun, and Kirkbride (2004, p 242, 257) assert:
Both shareholder and stakeholder perspectives
claim superiority of their models respectively;
however, in reality we have seen a dynamic shift
with both models becoming mutually attractive
all over the world in the last two decades … All
this implies is that the so-called superiority and
priority of any model is not permanent and
universal, but rather temporary and contextual.
Therefore each country would have to adapt these
theories into its historical experiences and cultural values
(OECD, 2004). 
On the topic of cultural values, there is substantial
literature on this subject matter even from the business
perspective. Deresky (2006, p 112) notes that:
The culture of a society comprises the shared
values, understandings, assumptions, and goals
that are passed down through generations and
imposed by the members of society. Cultural
and national differences strongly influence the
attitudes and expectations and therefore the on-
the-job behaviour of individuals and groups.
Managers must develop cultural sensitivity to
anticipate and accommodate behavioural
differences in different societies.
Hofstede (1991, p 13–5) developed value dimensions to
identify and profile the cultural and behavioural
differences between countries. Tales about differences in
many aspects of management between Chinese and
foreign (especially Western) managers show quite
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different approaches. A distinct cultural dimension in
managing is unmistakable (Child and Warner, 2003, 
p 37–9); yet, in the field of governance there has been
little research devoted to the cultural aspects.
In view of the fact that corporate governance is an alien
concept for China, it is understandable that Chinese
legislators look towards developed Western nations’
governance laws and codes as benchmarks. Though the
debate about transplanting laws is ongoing, there are
three issues arising relevant to this article. First the
cultural acceptability of the recipient, second the 
political agendas of the government, and third possible
inconsistencies and unintelligible provisions resulting from
the combination of the first and second issues.
Tam (1999, p 39–40) noted that the Chinese academics’
grasp of corporate governance was primarily influenced
by the agency theory, but he questioned its
appropriateness. The enticement to adopt Western
standards could be a matter of convenience to
modernise state owned enterprises (McNally, 2002, p 94).
Since the agency model was consistent with market
reforms to enhance confidence and encourage further
investments, it was a sensible choice. 
Hawes and Chiu (2006, p 28) argue that Western
countries’ corporate laws and governance models are
wrong for China:
Because of some basic flaws in the assumptions
of those advocating ‘Western-style’ corporate
governance in China… They are based on
assumptions about the purposes and functions
of business enterprises that are not shared by
most Chinese policy makers… even if Western-
style corporate governance reforms were
appropriate in China’s very different business
environment, the jury is still out on the
effectiveness of such reforms in their country of
origin, such as the United States. 
Shi (2005, p 84–5) concurs by noting:
The peculiarities of the social governance fabric
of a particular country can make harmonisation
with other foreign governance systems difficult…
Chinese social traditions and legal culture are
very different from those of Western countries
where contemporary ideas of corporate
governance developed. In particular the
development of state-owned enterprises, the
emergence of corporations and the coming into
existence of laws governing corporations have
thus taken a path that is distinct from those of
most other countries.
Governance models based on Chinese culture
orientations and political ideology would be much more
appropriate.
It is without a doubt that Confucius’s philosophy is deeply
rooted in the Chinese culture. The current Communist
regime has widely promoted the revival of Confucianism.
McKerra, Taneja and Young (1988, pp 54–5) observed:
A sign of growing Chinese nationalism in
intellectual life is the revival of pride in Chinese
culture… Part of this trend is the revival of
Confucianism. This is expressed in renewed
attention to morality and ethics, and an
emphasis on family values, at the same time as
modern and Western ideas are undermining
family stability in the major cities. The Confucian
revival stands for discipline in the workforce and
stability and harmony in politics. Official
spokespeople have espoused the view that
Confucianism is better fitted than Western
culture to form the basis of science or business.
In Confucian philosophies, the role of the State is central
to creating an orderly and civil society. Leaders of the
State and heads of households should rule with
benevolence. Confucius asserts that the rulers shall treat
its subjects like ‘parents’ caring for their ‘children’. This
paternalistic authority would ideally be exercised for the
betterment of its citizens (Chen, 1986, p 441, 442–5).
Therefore the role of the State does not appear to be
passive, instead it’s an active and powerful one. This
suggests the Chinese government’s role in corporate
governance would inevitably be in hierarchical and
patriarchal relationships (Mead, 2005, p 279). 
The head of the State or corporation is expected to be
an authoritarian and benevolent leader. Thus certain
moral superiority in the leadership is likely to be
expected, which means decisions are not always
justifiable in an analytical manner. Rather, personal values
and experience form the basis of decisions. The retention
of power and control over information by the head are
common attributes of patriarchal leadership (Chen, 2005,
p 73–5). 
Governance is therefore in the hands of ‘a few’, who
enjoy close relationships to central business and
management practices in China. Hence, when disputes
arise the Chinese prefer settlement by informal mediation
based on harmony, rather than by enforcement of legal
rights through litigation (Chen, 2003, p 259). Enacting
appropriate laws seems to be peripheral.
Among the citizens, maintaining a harmonious and close
relationship is another key attribute of Confucius’s
teachings (Child and Warner, 2003, p 28–9). The term
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‘guanxi’ is defined as a particular kind of interpersonal
relationship or connection that serves as a form of social
currency. They are informal associations and can provide
access to specific information, resources or to gain
influence (Tsui, Farh and Xin, 2000, p 225–44). This norm
has been embedded in
Chinese culture for centuries
and has survived under the
communist regime. People with
good guanxi provide favours to
each other. This makes the
maintenance of good
corporate governance even
more complicated. The
Chinese believe that family and
interpersonal relationships are
more secure than the law in
protecting the stakeholders’
interests (Tomasic and Fu,
1999, p 135–82). 
In view of these cultural and
political issues, corporate governance in China would
more than likely be shaped by Confucian philosophies
even though many of the ideas are transplanted from
Western countries. This could also explain why the
Chinese corporate laws are riddled with many
inconsistencies. Governance has tended to be driven by
customary practices rather than reform agendas. Even if
‘teething’ problems are not uncommon, the entrenched
cultural/political influences are evident. The discussions
below on the law and a case study on the Chinese
telecommunications sector attempt to demonstrate the
cultural/political dimensions of governance in China. 
State prescribed governance under 
Chinese company law
The Company Law was first enacted on 1 July 1994.
Except for a very minor amendment in 1999 on two
articles, nothing was done over the next twelve years. On
1 January 2006, substantial amendments were
introduced. The two dominant types of companies under
the law are limited liability companies (LLC) and joint
stock companies (JSC). 
It is evident from the new Company Law, which came
into effect in 2006, that many provisions are difficult to
apply as they are brief and written in ambiguous
language. They led an author of this article to undertake
a literature survey of Chinese legal academics in an
attempt to grasp how Chinese academics come to terms
with those ambiguities. Suffice to say that in all the issues
discussed, none of those authors offered any concrete
explanations on most of the vague sections of the law
(Lau, 2006). They merely state the provisions in the
statute, followed by a brief statement. Hence, without
clarification or further amendments, we doubt the
application of current laws will be credible during any
subsequent litigation.
Below we discuss some of the problematic areas in the
current laws.
Establishment of a trade union in each company
Each LLC or JSC must establish its own trade union to
take care of staff welfare (Art 18). This is arguably an
extension of socialistic ideals drawn from the ‘quasi-
market’ paradox in the economic reform propaganda,
but there is no penalty for non-compliance. One can only
speculate that this provision was enacted to serve
political ends.
Establishment of a grass root organisation in each
company (Art 19)
The grass root organisation (GRO) is a typical working
unit within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP
Charter provides that any Chinese organisation (such as
schools, companies, or factories) must establish a GRO if
it contains at least three CCP members. The GRO
provides a venue for CCP members to socialise and
discuss. The issues can cover a broad range. They include
whether CCP members are treated fairly or whether their
organisation is following CCP’s party lines. The CCP cuts
through every aspect of life in China, since it is the only
ruling party. Strangely, there is again no penalty provision
for non-compliance. 
Shareholders decide major corporate policies
This is probably the most significant difference in
corporate governance between Chinese and common
companies. In HK companies, the board of directors
makes all the strategic business decisions. In LLCs and
JSCs, shareholders decide business policies (Arts 38 and
103). This is so without regard to whether shareholders
know how to run a business. The board of directors are
only given a subsidiary role to decide the business plan
(Arts 47 and 112). 
... corporate governance in China
would more than likely be shaped
by Confucian philosophies even
though many of the ideas are
transplanted from Western
countries. This could also explain
why the Chinese corporate laws are
riddled with many inconsistencies. 
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Inspection of board decisions by shareholders
Stemming from the above, if shareholders make
important corporate decisions, obviously they want to
check whether the directors have implemented such
decisions (Arts 34 and 98). However, the statute does not
provide guidance on how a company can protect itself
against sensitive information being leaked to non-
shareholders. 
Presence of staff directors
Both Chinese and HK companies have directors elected
by shareholders. However, there is a second type of
director in LLCs and JSCs whom the staff members elect
amongst themselves (Arts 45 and 109). There is no
differentiation between the legal responsibilities of both
types of directors and they have the same duties. The
Company Law does not prescribe the number of staff
directors in a company. 
Presence of the supervisory board
China adopted the civil law company structure and so a
second board also exists. The board consists of
representatives from shareholders and staff members. Its
main task is to monitor and ensure that senior officers
comply with the law (Arts 52 and 118). If they do not,
supervisors are authorised to sue these officers in the
name of the company.
Passing of resolutions in supervisory boards
without a majority vote
If the supervisory board does decide to sue a rogue
director, a resolution must be passed. The votes required
are ‘more than’ half of the votes (Arts 56 and 120). To a
HK director or shareholder, the term ‘more than’ is hardly
surprising because it means exceeding. Yet in Chinese
civil law, ‘more than’ (in Chinese yi shang) actually means
‘equal to or more than’ by virtue of Art 155 of GPCL. So
a supervisory board can pass a resolution if exactly half of
its members decide to sue, regardless of what the other
half think! 
Presence of supervisors and managers in
meetings of the board of directors 
Both supervisors and managers are permitted to attend
meetings of the board of directors but not to vote there
(Arts 50, 55, 114 and 119). This makes LLCs and JSCs
more transparent than their HK counterparts. However,
there is no provision to protect against information being
leaked. 
Directors’ duties
There are two types of duties: the duty of honesty and
the duty of diligence (Art 184). Both duties are not
defined in the Company Law. It is, however, possible to
presume that the duty of honesty is a passive duty. This is
because Chinese law does not have the equitable
concept of the fiduciary duty, which is a pro-active duty.
The duty of diligence should be based on an objective
standard because this is the international standard. 
The controlling shareholder
This is defined as a shareholder holding ‘more than’ 50%
of shares in the company. There are two problems. First,
‘more than’ again means that holding just 50% qualifies
as a controlling shareholder. However, in order to pass
resolutions in LLCs and JSCs, a majority vote is required.
A 50% shareholder cannot carry a majority vote because
the shareholder is 1%  short. So how can that shareholder
‘control’ the company? Secondly, in Chinese companies,
major decisions require a two-third vote. One can
effectively control a Chinese company if one holds only
34% of the votes so there is no need to hold 50% to
become a controlling shareholder.
Absence of the company secretary
There is no company secretary in LLCs and unlisted JSCs.
One of the senior officers may also take up the post of
the chief administrative officer. However, for listed JSCs, a
secretary of the board of directors is required. This
person’s role is very similar to the role of the common law
company secretary. See for example the Guidelines of
Articles of Association of Chinese Listed Companies,
issued by the CSRC on 16 March 2006. 
Substantial requirements for issuing bonds
Article 16 of the Chinese Securities Law requires a
minimum net asset of RMB 60 and 30 million respectively
for LLCs and JSCs before they can issue bonds. Note that
the figures for the much smaller LLC is double that for
the much larger JSCs. It is suggested that the very high
threshold figures are means adopted by the Chinese
Government to discourage the issuing of bonds because
the market is not yet mature enough to entertain an
influx of bonds. Hong Kong companies have no such
minimum requirements.
Minority shareholders can petition a company to
be wound up by the court
Article 183 provides that shareholders with 10% or more
can petition the court to wind up a company if it is in
serious finance difficulty, if continuing will cause great loss
to shareholders, and there is no other available solution.
It is interesting to note that the same application in Hong
Kong would require 75% of the shareholders’ votes to
consent. But there are no additional reasons required. It
is submitted that this is an attempt to give minority
shareholders more say in LLCs and JSCs. However, as
there is no definition for the term ‘serious’, in the end the
Hong Kong version might end up easier to follow.
Tokley and Ravn (1998, p 11) argued that the company
law was driven by the Government’s desire to attract
foreign capital and investors. Jia (2005, p 234) states that,
‘[p]art of the impetus for reforming corporate governance
Thought Leadership Articles 65
in China has come from the perceived urgency of
improving the competitiveness of China’s publicly listed
companies in the global financial market that has
developed after China joined the WTO in 2001’.
Motivations of the government aside, China’s company
law appears to either suffer from contractions and
inconsistencies, or an attempt by the authorities to enact
a law governing modern businesses with traces of
Chinese philosophical influence and prevailing political
realities.
State driven governance in the
telecommunications sector 
In an earlier article, two co-authors of this article studied
the regulatory approach and rationale of Indonesia and
China’s telecommunications sector (Young, Rahaju and Li,
2005). In this section, we revisit some of those
experiences with emphasis and additional analysis of
certain governance issues that arise.
For several decades, the Ministry of Post and Telecom
(MPT) and Provincial Posts & Telecoms Bureaus (PPTs)
had a state sanctioned monopoly (Zita, 2000, p 34). Apart
from certain telecommunications infrastructure
operations delegated to the Ministry of Electronics
Industry (MEI) for defence purposes and the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had its own
dedicated telecommunications infrastructure, MPT and
PPTs enjoyed exclusive powers to plan, construct,
operate and regulate the country’s public networks (Wu,
2004, p 220–1). Consequently, for many years MPT’s
sub-standard performance was evident, but they had no
incentive to improve or be efficient. This changed when
‘open door’ policies compelled the dismantling of the
state imposed monopoly (Zhou, 1997). 
Breaking up the monopoly 
Economic reforms were expected, at least according to
the official propaganda, to introduce greater
efficiencies and growth. However the reform had
created unintended consequences, a ‘tug-of-war’
between various government ministries for a share of
the lucrative telecommunications market (Yan, Levine
and Pitt, 1998, p 375–92). The negotiated outcome
resulted in the introduction of ‘limited competition’
dominated by a small number of players (Ure, 1997, 
p 34). Observers described this process as ‘turf warfare’
(Lovelock and Ure, 1998). 
The Directorate-General of Telecommunications (DGT)
became separated from the postal operations and the
corporatisation of China Telecom in 1995. In line with
privatisation expectations, the government wanted
MPT to be an independent regulator. However, the new
management in China Telecom had strong personal
connections (guanxi) with MPT (Becky and Loo, 2004, p
697-714), which enabled China Telecom to retain its
dominance and enjoy many privileges. In particular,
China Telecom seemed immune from public discontent
(Wu, 2000). Nevertheless, this domination attracted
many potential challenges. Other ministries started to
look for ways to get a ‘slice of the cake’. After years of
negotiation and inter-ministries bargaining, the State
Council finally approved new entrants in the market. As
a result of this approval, China Telecom’s legal
monopoly was curtailed. JiTong Communications
Company (JiTong) and China Unicom were established
in a relatively short period of time.
Unfortunately, the new entrants did not bring about
greater competition. China Unicom encountered many
problems with China Telecom. In fact, Unicom faced the
same problems all new entrants faced against China
Telecom. There were no agreed terms for revenue
sharing or universal service obligation. Unicom lacked
vital resources to develop a stand-alone network and was
therefore more inclined to look for overseas technical
partners and finance. This permitted MPT to oppose any
expansion plans with foreign participation or partnership
(Ure, 1995).
The 1998 and 2002 shakeups
Lobbying led by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI),
Ministry of Railways (MOR), Ministry of information
Industry (MII), China International Trade and Investment
Corporation (CITIC) and other interest groups brought
the most significant reform to the telecommunications
sector in 1998 and consequently in 2002.
In March 1998, whilst reforming the Chinese bureaucracy,
MEI and MPT, the former rivals in the telecom market,
were merged with State Radio Regulation Commission
and formed a new ministry, the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII), which became a principal regulator of the
telecommunications and information industry.
Government news releases stated that the purpose of
this reform was to set up an independent regulator
necessary for a competitive market. However, observers
believed that this was a concession of ‘an
uncompromised battle’ (Hui, 2000, p 44–68).
Yet, after the 1998 restructure, the battle for domination
in the telecommunications sector persisted. During
1999–2000, the newly established MII led the market
through a complicated restructuring program to
accommodate all other competing interest groups. 
As a result, ministries negotiated a new ‘playing field’
with a total of six SOEs in 2000, breaking up China
Telecom’s four divisions of services into separate entities.
Consequently, four independent companies were formed.
They were responsible for the fixed line, mobile, paging
and satellite communication services, respectively. Figures
1, 2 and 3 describe the 1998 reform from the functions
performed and the players’ perspective.
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As one can imagine,
the superficial
compromise between
operators was never a
permanent resolution.
Not surprisingly, in
May 2002, the Chinese
State Council created
six multi-functional
state-owned
enterprises with a high
degree of functional
overlap. The sector
was reorganised 
again, apparently a
negotiated outcome
between various
operators brokered 
by the government.
Figure 3 details this
new arrangement.
Figure 3
Since the 2002 
reform, the Chinese
telecommunications
services have six major
providers including
internet and other value-added businesses and this
topography of competition remains unchanged to date. 
The current topology
Upon closer scrutiny, it is not difficult to find that there
are many similar attributes amongst various telecom
companies. They are
• The types of the companies—Except China Telecom,
the rest of the companies are LLCs.
• The ownership of the companies—The Chinese
government in conjunction with various ministries or
departments are the
controlling
shareholders of all six
telecommunications
companies,
undoubtedly securing
full control and
ongoing revenues. 
• The management of
the companies—The
management of all six
companies are very
similar in terms of the
senior management
teams. They are either
former government
officers or ex-political appointees with only a handful
of non-executive directors whose independence
appears little more than tokenistic. Therefore,
governmental involvement in decision-making,
especially on key strategic issues, could not be
eliminated (Wang, 2006, p 16).
It is interesting to note that the majority of top
management have spent their entire careers in the
telecom industry whether it be with the public or private
sector. For example, the Chairman and CEO of China
Telecom used to be vice president of China Mobile and
served the government for 25 years. The current
1998 Reform—new arrangement for playersFigure 2: 
Source: Young, Rahaju and Li (2005)
1998 Reform—new arrangement for functions/servicesFigure 1: 
Source: Young, Rahaju and Li (2005)
Landline China Telecom, Unicom and some local cable TV networks
Unicom, China Telecom,  Netcom, Jitong and China Mobile
China Telecom,  Unicom, Netcom, Jitong and China Mobile and
potential entrants (eg. the cable TV networks)
Unicom and many other providers
China Mobile, Unicom, Great Wall and potential entrants 
(China Satellite, China Telecom)
Mobile
Paging
IP
Telephone
Data
China Telecom — still holds an absolute majority market
share in fixed-line phone market
China Mobile — operates in mobile phone market, with an
initial market share of 50% in mobile market
China Satellite — operates satellite business, which was
originally owned by China Telecom
China Netcom — builds and operates a broadband data
transmission network and provides Internet services
Unchanged
The second largest fixed network provider by transferring to
it a telephony network established by the Chinese Ministry 
of Railways along China’s rail networks
Was strengthened by obtaining mobile’s paging business 
and permitted to maintain its 25% market share in mobile
telephony as well as roll out new CDMA mobile technologies
Old China
Telecom
China
Unicom
China
Railcom
Ji Tong
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Chairman and CEO of
China Unicom also
came from long service
as a government
official, as well as one
of the senior
executives in China
Telecom. However,
such behaviours seem
to be common and
normal in China.
Another minor
commonality amongst
these telecom
companies is that many
have a combined
Chairman and CEO.
This person possesses
considerable power
over all aspects of the
company operations, as well as having strong links with
various government departments.
All in all, the process and outcomes of China’s massive
privatisation of the telecommunications sector could be
considered as both positive and negative. On the positive
side, China’s telecommunications sector has moved into
the modern era. There are several major providers
offering more competitive products and services. Then
again, on the negative side, instead of a ‘super’
monopoly the telecommunications sector has become an
oligopoly with several service providers who are in fact
state owned enterprises operating as private companies
(as most are LLC) and managed by a small group of elite
ex-government officials. 
Given this prevailing reality, corporate governance of this
sector still lies in the Chinese government hands. The
twist is perhaps the meaning of government here is not
one entity, rather a group of departments operating
these companies with commercial ends, thereby
reaffirming Duckett’s notion of ‘state entrepreneurialism’,
where state bureaucracies adapt to market reform as an
enabler to facilitate the transition of planned to market
economy, as well as becoming entrepreneurs performing
rent seeking activities (Duckett, 1998, p 13–15 and Chen,
2001, p 180).
Conclusion
After more than three decades of change in China, it is
undeniable to any observer that the economic reforms
have been successful by any standards. The economic
reforms were not intended to emulate the Western free
market ideals, even though some of the ideas are
borrowed from Western nations. Yet there are a number
of challenges, Chen (2001, p 180) notes that:
• It is unrealistic to expect that in the next twenty years
China will become like Japan—which has thrived
through its adoption of American-led Western
capitalism. Instead, it is likely that the PRC will take a
few decades to find a balance between Western free-
market enterprise and the historical influences of
communism, nationalism, and Confucianism.
Unlike economic reforms, legal reforms are far more
complex. On one hand, there are those who believe there
will be a convergence between different countries, as
globalisation would bring about greater integration in 
how markets are regulated. On the other hand, given the
fundamental difference in political ideologies and cultural
attitudes, legal reform is not just a matter of changing a
few laws or reforming a few institutions to transform the
legal system. There are obvious limitations with regards to
transplanting foreign Western laws into Chinese legislation.
Corporate governance poses a unique challenge for
Chinese legislators because it is the intersection of
both economic and legal reforms. Samir Chatterjee and
Alan Nankervis (2003, p 51–3) argue that, ‘the great
challenge for Asian societies is to simultaneously
integrate with the modern world and to rejoin with
their past’. Not to mention the fact that the current
Company Law in China as it stands has quite a few 
non-operable and inconsistent provisions.
Evidently many sections of the Chinese Company Law
manifest political/cultural undertones, which do not sit
well with the agency model, a concept borrowed from
developed Western economies. Apart from the
relative lack of experience on the part of the Chinese
legislators in transplanting laws from other countries,
2002 Reform—Intermixing the functions of the playersFigure 3: 
Source: Young, Rahaju and Li (2005)
China
Railcom
China
Unicom
China
Netcom
China
Satellite
China
Mobile
China
Telecom
China Telecom, Northern (part of China Netcom) — permitted to
operate a mobile telephony and fixed line, operates with China Netcom
China Telecom, Southern — new China Telecom: permitted to
operate a mobile telephony and fixed line
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this could help explain the many inconsistent and
vague provisions. 
The telecommunications sector in China underwent
major changes from a State owned monopoly to
privatisation and introduction of new providers. Despite
the transformation, some things do not change. The
presence of State linkages in these new corporations
suggests the State intertwines with how businesses are
governed. This is not necessarily detrimental to how
businesses operate if the State does not interfere with
decision-making or influence those corporations from
the objectives of profitability. Nevertheless, this makes
real competition difficult to achieve. 
In a Confucian society, the role of the State is not a
passive one. Along with the acceptance of paternalistic
leadership and the importance of guanxi in business and
political circles, government intervention in SOEs and
the wider economic transactions will not fade away
anytime soon. Given this, the pertinent question is: what
is the appropriate framework to reform China’s
corporate governance? 
Perhaps Hawes and Chiu (2006, p 51–3) are right to
suggest that the Chinese government should do more to
raise the awareness of ethical issues. Reviving
Confucius’s teaching has a clear advantage apart from
the cultural considerations. It is consistent with the CCP’s
political objectives. However, Confucian philosophy is
thousands of years old. China is no longer a feudal
regime with a peasant economy. Modern revisions and
applications have to be developed. In order to transform
Confucius’s principles into prescriptive legal provisions,
much research has to be done. Therefore, the reforms in
China’s corporate laws and governance so far should be
seen as a mere footnote compared to the task of coding
Confucius’s philosophies into Chinese laws to suit a
modern China. ❖
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